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Abstract 
Memory technologies are cultural artifacts that scaffold, transform, and are interwoven with 
human biological memory systems. The goal of this article is to provide a systematic and integrative 
survey of their philosophical dimensions, including their metaphysical, epistemological and ethical 
dimensions, drawing together debates across the humanities, cognitive sciences, and social 
sciences. Metaphysical dimensions of memory technologies include their function, the nature of 
their informational properties, ways of classifying them, and their ontological status. 
Epistemological dimensions include the truth-conduciveness of external memory, the conditions 
under which external memory counts as knowledge, and the metacognitive monitoring of external 
memory processes. And lastly, ethical and normative dimensions include the desirability of the 
effects memory technologies have on biological memory, their effects on self and culture, and their 
moral status. Whilst the focus in the article is largely philosophical and conceptual, empirical issues 
such as the way we interact with memory technologies in various contexts are also discussed. We 
thus take a naturalistic approach in which philosophical and empirical concepts and approaches are 
seen as continuous. 
 
Keywords: external memory; function; information; extended mind; extended knowledge; cognitive 
enhancement; neuroethics; metacognition  
 
1. Introduction 
Human biological memory systems are complex, multifaceted phenomena. Technologies that 
scaffold, aid, and transform biological memory are likewise complex and multifaceted. Such 
technologies are studied by a variety of academic disciplines, including philosophy (Clark & 
Chalmers 1998; Rowlands 1999; Sutton 2010; Michaelian 2012), cognitive science (Sparrow, Liu & 
Wegner 2011; Risko & Dunn 2015), media and cultural studies (van Dijck 2007), human-computer 
interaction (van den Hoven 2014), design studies (Norman 1993), and cognitive archaeology (Jones 
2007). A full understanding of memory technologies thus requires an integrative and 
interdisciplinary approach. Whilst the topics addressed in this paper are mainly philosophical or 
conceptual, they are informed by empirical research from some of the disciplines just mentioned. 
We take a broadly naturalistic approach, which means that we see philosophical and empirical 
concepts and approaches on a continuum rather than strictly separated. From a naturalistic 
perspective, philosophy is closely allied with theoretical and experimental work in cognitive and 
social sciences. More concretely, metaphysical, epistemological and ethical reflections on memory 
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technologies are partly grounded in empirical research. Ongoing developments in the empirical 
sciences of memory technology are highly relevant for a philosophical understanding of such 
technologies. 
 
Merlin Donald (1991) is one of the first cognitive theorists to draw attention to the importance of 
artifacts for better understanding our memory practices. Donald argues that memory technologies 
gave rise to a new stage in our cognitive evolution, one that is characterized by offloading memory 
storage onto the environment. He provides a detailed and elaborate overview of different ways of 
externalizing and materializing human thought, ranging from monument decorations, cave 
paintings, significant objects, knotted cords, clay tablets, alphabets, number systems, archives, 
maps, pictures, diagrams, calendars, musical scores, books, and computer applications. Such 
external symbols are referred to by Donald as exograms, as opposed to engrams. “An exogram is 
simply an external memory record of an idea”, whereas an engram is “a single entry in the 
biological memory system” (Donald 1991, p. 314). Exograms have different properties than 
engrams. Engrams are internalized and realized in the medium and format of the brain, whereas 
exograms are external and much less constrained in their format and capacity. The storage capacity 
of exograms far exceeds the storage capacity of both single entries and clusters of entries in 
biological memory. Exograms are flexible in that they can be reformatted and easily transmitted 
across different media, whereas engrams are less flexible. These differences certainly do not always 
apply, but when they do, they are enabled by the particular materiality, malleability, and format of 
external artifacts. The most important property of exograms, on Donald’s view, is their capacity for 
continuous refinement. Exograms are human-made and are undergoing a process of iteration, 
testing, and improvement. So, they allow us to externalize the products of thinking and to examine 
and change their content in an ongoing way, which is very difficult to do in the brain. 
 
Donald argues that human biological memory systems are embedded in a cultural network of 
external memory nodes. Many others have subsequently argued that human remembering takes 
place in an ecology of informational objects and structures that scaffold but also restructure our 
biological memory systems (Rowlands 1999; Bell & Gemmell 2009; Sutton 2010, 2015; Clowes 2013, 
2017; Michaelian & Sutton 2013; Hutchins 2014; Hoskins 2016). The rest of this article provides an 
overview of the philosophical issues concerning memory technologies in all their complexity, 
focussing on their metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical properties broadly construed. As these 
are the three branches of philosophy, they allow us to cover a substantial amount of conceptual-
philosophical dimensions of memory technologies.  
2. Metaphysics 
It is difficult to define what metaphysics precisely is, but for the purpose of this paper we can define 
metaphysics as the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature of reality, focussing on better 
understanding the properties and categories of objects, structures, and processes. Metaphysical 
dimensions of memory technologies include their function, the nature of their informational 
properties, ways of classifying them, and their ontological status. Memory technologies can be 
characterized as material artifacts intentionally used to scaffold or aid memory processes, 
comprising a heterogeneous category of objects and structures. Many material artifacts 
unintentionally trigger internal memories. An old concert ticket used as a bookmark, for instance, 
may trigger memories of a concert you have seen. But if we include objects that accidentally or 
unintentionally trigger internal memories into the category of memory technologies, then it seems 
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that the category becomes unrealistically large and conceptually intractable. The phrase “memory 
techniques” may be used for internal mnemonics. A striking example are Japanese students who 
have learned to visualize the structure of an abacus and to internally manipulate the beads in their 
mind’s eye as to perform calculations (de Cruz 2008). In this case, the actual material abacus is no 
longer needed as its mnemonic functions are fully internalized.  
 
Another example of a memory technique is the method of loci, whereby an agent memorizes 
certain spatial relations, for example the rooms in a house, and has learned to associate certain 
items, for example images, faces, or lists of words, with particular locations in rooms (Sutton 2010). 
When trying to remember the items, the agent imagines walking through the rooms (i.e. the loci) 
which evokes memories of the associated items. To give an example: when using the method of loci 
to construct a shopping list, one would image walking through the house and put certain items on 
specific locations. A bottle of wine on the kitchen table, some cheese on the kitchen dresser, milk 
on the desk in the study room, a baguette near the front door, etc. When in the supermarket, one 
re-imagines the same route through the house, which evokes memories of the wine, cheese, milk, 
and baguette, in that way allowing one to remember what one wants to buy. This technique or 
method does not involve interacting with physical artifacts and so should not be seen as part of the 
category of memory technologies. It does, however, demonstrate that even internal memory can be 
highly artificial, in that it is actively and intentionally constructed.  
 
The category of memory technologies can be seen as a subcategory of cognitive artifacts. Cognitive 
artifacts are material objects used to aid not just memory, but all kinds of cognitive tasks and 
processes such as navigating, calculating, making inferences, and problem-solving (Norman 1991, 
1993; Hutchins 1999; Heersmink 2013, 2016a). The current debate in the metaphysics of technology 
concerning artifact function (e.g., Houkes & Vermaas 2010; Preston 2013) is relevant for better 
understanding memory technologies. Are functions established by the intentions of the designer or 
the intentions of the user? It seems that the intentions of the user are more important to establish 
the memory function of an artifact. If the intentions of the designer are necessary to establish the 
memory functions of an artifact, then we cannot account for improvised uses of artifacts (Preston 
2013). Leaving a DVD on your desk as a reminder to bring it back to the video store is an improvised 
mnemonic use of an artifact. We want to be able to include such improvised memory functions into 
the category of memory technologies. The intentions of the user and the cultural practices of 
artifact-use are more important than the intentions of the designer (but compare Vaccari 2016). We 
therefore need a pluralist notion of memory technology that can account for both intended and 
improvised mnemonic functions.  
 
How can we further divide or taxonomize this pluralist and heterogeneous category of objects and 
structures? John Sutton (2015) suggests three ways in which we can taxonomize external memory 
systems: by cognitive domain, type of resource, and timescale. That is, in terms of the specific 
memory capacity an external resource scaffolds (working, semantic or episodic memory), what kind 
of resource is scaffolding that capacity (e.g., specific artifacts, other people, cultural institutions), 
and for how long it is scaffolding it (e.g., evolutionary timescales, ontogenetic timescales, or in the 
here-and-now). As Sutton says “The point of all such taxonomies is to seek more differentiated 
ontologies, or to be in a position then to study the particular ways the notion might apply in specific 
contexts” (2015, p. 192).  
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Richard Heersmink (2013, 2016a) suggests a narrower and more specific approach to taxonomizing 
external memory systems, viz. in terms of the particular informational properties of the artifact in 
question. To this end, Heersmink takes as a starting point a distinction between representational 
and non-representational information. Artifacts with representational properties function as stand-
ins for their target system and have aboutness or representational content (Kirsh 2010). A map of 
Sydney, for example, is an external representation of the layout of the city’s roads and other 
infrastructures. There are different kinds of representational properties. A distinction between 
icons, indices, and symbols is borrowed from Charles Saunders Peirce (1935). Icons show relevant 
isomorphism to their target system. A map, for example, shows isomorphism to what it represents. 
Indices have a direct causal connection to their target system. A thermometer, for instance, is 
directly connected to the temperature. Symbols such as language and number systems obtain their 
meaning and content by means of logical rules and social agreement. Memory artifacts often have a 
combination of iconic, indexical, or symbolic properties, but one of those properties is typically 
predominant (Atkin 2008). 
 
Memory artifacts with non-representational properties, by contrast, do not function as stand-ins for 
their target and do not have content. A key example of a non-representational memory technology 
is described by David Kirsh (1995), who details how cooks place utensils and ingredients such that 
they facilitate the order of steps in the cocking process. In this example, the location of objects 
becomes cognitively meaningful to the user not through isomorphism, direct causal connections, or 
logical rules, but through what Kirsh calls “the intelligent use of space”. Kirsh makes a tripartite 
distinction between spatial arrangements of objects that simplify choice, perception, or internal 
computation. Other non-representational memory artifacts are related to autobiographical 
memory. Objects that are personally significant such as souvenirs, clothing, furniture, books, and 
musical instruments, are often connected to specific personal experiences or specific episodes from 
one’s past. Sociologist Sherry Turkle (2007) refers to such objects as “evocative objects” as they 
invite us to reminisce about the past. Such objects connect us to our past but not necessarily by 
means of their representational properties. The mnemonic function of such objects is not 
established through isomorphism, direct causal connections, or symbolic properties, but through 
the meaning we subjectively attach to such objects. In the final section, we continue by outlining 
the relation between evocative objects, autobiographical memory, and the narrative self. 
 
Lastly, the ontological status of memory technologies is relational in that such technologies are 
defined in relation to human biological memory. Some philosophers go further and have argued 
that the external artifact is not just defined in relation to the human memory system, but can 
literally be part of an extended (Clark & Chalmers 1998; Rowlands 1999; Clark 2003, 2008; Menary 
2007; Sutton 2010) or distributed memory system (Hutchins 1995; Michaelian & Sutton 2013), 
whereas others have denied this (Adams & Aizawa 2001; Rupert 2013). A key example in the 
extended mind debate is Clark & Chalmers’ case of ‘Otto’ and his notebook. Otto is a man in the 
first stages of Alzheimer’s disease and uses a notebook to compensate his deteriorating biological 
memory system. Clark and Chalmers (1998) claim that information in the notebook (e.g., addresses, 
phone numbers, appointments, etc.) plays a relevantly similar functional role as information in 
biological memory. Additionally, information in the notebook is reliable, trustworthy, easily 
accessible, and has been endorsed in the past and, indeed, is there because of this past 
endorsement. For these reasons, the notebook should be seen as a constitutive part of Otto’s 
memory system. 
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Clark and Chalmers motivate their view with the parity principle:  
 
“If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it done 
in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, 
then that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process” (Clark & Chalmers 
1998, p. 8). 
 
Donald has argued along similar lines. He writes: “External memory is best defined in functional 
terms: it is the exact external analogue of internal or biological memory, namely a storage and 
retrieval systems that allows humans to accumulate experience and knowledge” (1991, p. 309, 
original italics). Both Donald (1991) and Clark and Chalmers (1998) emphasize functional 
isomorphism between the inner and outer. By doing so, they downplay differences between 
internal and external states and processes. It is, however, important to note that there are actually 
differences between internal and external memories. There are, for example, differences in how 
internal memories and external memories are stored and processed. Internal memories are stored 
in biological neural networks that are subject to blending and interfering. This implies that 
information stored in biomemory is shaped and updated on the basis of previously stored and new 
incoming information. External memories, by contrast, are stored in discrete format and are further 
static, less dynamic, and not automatically integrated with other information (Sutton 2010; 
Heersmink 2015). Biological memory is thus holistic and integrative, whereas external memory is 
not.  
 
Given the problems associated with parity claims, Sutton has identified and developed a distinctive 
route to extended cognition based on what he refers to as the “complementarity principle”: 
 
“In extended cognitive systems, external states and processes need not mimic or replicate 
the formats, dynamics or functions of inner states and processes. Rather, different 
components of the overall (enduring or temporary) system can play quite different roles 
and have different properties while coupling in collective and complementary contributions 
to flexible thinking and acting” (Sutton 2010, p. 194). 
 
On such a view, memory technologies and other cognitive artifacts need not exhibit similar 
properties and functions to internal states and processes. Rather, they typically complement 
internal states and processes with different properties and functions. Complementarity claims are 
also found in Clark’s own work. In a co-authored chapter with Rob Wilson he writes: “Tracing and 
understanding such deep complementarity is, we claim, the single most important task confronting 
the study of situated cognition” (Wilson & Clark, 2009, p. 70). Clark is thus well-aware that external 
memories can be quite different from internal memories. Complementarity approaches to 
extended cognition focus on the degree of integration of agent and resource (Menary 2007; Sutton 
et al 2010; Heersmink 2015). On this view, human cognitive systems and artifacts are integrated 
into wider systems that perform cognitive tasks. 
3. Epistemology 
Epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature and sources of knowledge, 
focussing on notions of belief, truth, justification, and reasoning. The epistemological ramifications 
of memory technologies are striking. On the one hand, as Michael Lynch (2016) has noted, 
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increased cognitive offloading provides new ways to acquire and store more information quickly 
and seamlessly (cf., Clark 2015). For example, consider a high-tech twist on the extended cognition 
case of Otto (Clark & Chalmers 1998), canvassed in §2. Suppose that (like many of us) Otto uses 
smartphone apps for storing a range of information that individuals have traditionally stored in 
biological memory: birthdays, phone numbers, diary events, deadlines, etc. Suppose further (to 
borrow a case from Clark et al 2017) that Otto relies on a range of other complex memory-assisting 
apps to organize his life. His Diaro app functions as his personal journal (cf., Carter and Pritchard 
2017) and his CPR Tempo app reminds him how to administer CPR in an emergency, etc. And finally, 
suppose that Otto’s reliance on this technology is consonant with the kinds of demands (see §2) 
Clark and Chalmers impose on genuine extended memory processes.  
 
From an epistemological point of view, there are several things that can be said on Otto’s behalf. 
For one thing, given that Otto is in such a circumstance practicing (by stipulation) good epistemic 
hygiene, (Clark 2015), we should expect the epistemic status of the information stored in Otto’s 
gadgets to be at least on a par with analogous information stored in biomemory (cf., Pritchard 
2010; Palermos 2015; cf., Bernecker 2010). And indeed, as J. Adam Carter (2017) has argued, there 
is even some reason to suppose that the epistemic status of the information stored in Otto’s 
extended-memory is comparatively more secure than analogous information stored in biomemory. 
This point can be made in terms of the comparative fragility of information stored in biomemory as 
opposed to extended memory, conditioned upon the initial acquisition of the stored information. 
 
To appreciate this point, an example will be useful. Just suppose, to use a variation on a case from 
Carter (2017), you are told that the deadline for submitting a paper to a journal is 13 April. If you do 
not think about this date again (viz., if you don’t focus on it, rehearse it to yourself) the date will 
probably remain in short-term memory for up approximately 20 seconds (Revlin 2012). Whether 
this information is transferred to long-term memory storage, however, typically depends on the 
kind of memory rehearsal that is undertaken. Maintenance rehearsal—e.g., repeating out loud the 
date several times—generates the result that the information will remain in short-term memory 
storage longer than otherwise (Greene 1987). However, some level of deeper processing—
elaborative rehearsal (e.g., as when one not merely repeats the information, but connects the 
information to other information one already possesses)—will plausibly be needed if the date 
you’ve been told is to be transferred from short-term into long-term memory storage (Goldstein 
2011). Moreover, even in cases that feature elaborative rehearsal, various factors such as alcohol 
consumption can impair the transfer of information from short-term to long-term biomemory 
storage (Atkinson & Shriffin 1968).  
 
The situation is very different—and arguably comparatively more epistemically safe—in the case of 
extended memory. Otto, for instance, to transfer information from short-term to long-term 
extended memory (e.g., in his phone app, electronic diary, etc.) requires no analogous kind of 
deeper processing. For Otto, such a transfer is entirely automatic; nor is the information subject to 
various kinds of defeaters (e.g. alcohol consumption, etc.) that can have a deleterious effect on the 
reliability of information stored exclusively in biomemory. This is, as Carter (2017) and Carter and 
Kallestrup (2017) have noted, an epistemically relevant disanalogy between biomemory and 
extended memory which seems to speak in favour of the epistemic credentials of extended 
memory. 
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However, there is also some cause to be pessimistic about the epistemic status of information 
stored in extended memory. This point becomes clear when we think about the difference between 
biomemory and extended memory in terms of knowledge and extended knowledge (Pritchard 
2017). Does Otto attain memory-supported knowledge of the information stored in his apps? This 
question has been a focus of much recent discussion in the literature at the intersection of 
mainstream epistemology and extended memory cases (see, for example, the collections of papers 
in Clark, Pritchard and Vaesen 2012; Carter et al 2014; 2017 and Carter and Palermos 2015). 
Attempts to answer it have given rise to at least three distinct puzzles. 
 
The first puzzle concerns extended memory and epistemic credit. According to one popular position 
in mainstream epistemology, virtue epistemology (e.g., Zagzebski 1996; Greco 2003, 2010; Sosa 
2007, 2015), one counts as knowing only if one’s believing truly is primarily creditable to one’s own 
cognitive abilities (cf., Lackey 2007). However, as Krist Vaesen (2011) among others have argued, 
the kinds of cases that feature extended memory (by the lights of extended cognition) are plausibly 
not cases where the individual can be primarily credited with her cognitive success. To the extent 
that this is right, a vindication of the information stored in extra-organismic memory as genuine 
knowledge appears to be at tension with the core virtue epistemology insight. See, however, 
Christoph Kelp (2014) for an argument (contra Vaesen) that despite initial appearances these 
positions can be reconciled; see also Duncan Pritchard (2010) for an argument that virtue 
epistemology is compatible with extended knowledge only if the credit condition is suitably 
weakened.  
 
The second and third puzzles concerning extended memory knowledge surround the issue of 
reliability endorsement. Obviously, we needn’t first endorse the reliability of our own biological 
memory in order to be justified in believing (as well as knowing) the deliverances of biological 
memory in ordinary circumstances. However, as Pritchard (2010) has argued, there is some 
epistemological pressure to suppose that additional demands are in place in the case of external 
memory. For example, on Pritchard’s view, if one adds some new memory technology to one’s 
cognitive architecture (say, one begins incorporating some new app or software in information 
storage and retrieval), one cannot be justified in blindly accepting the deliverances of the 
technology if one has no view as to whether the incorporated technology is reliable. Accordingly, 
Pritchard submits that extended memory knowledge requires that the agent incorporating the new 
technology at some point endorse its reliability.  
 
We are now in a position to state the second and third puzzles concerning the extended memory 
knowledge. The first puzzle, due to Carter and Kallestrup (2017) is that even if such an endorsement 
condition could be unproblematically satisfied in cases where the memory technology is used as a 
kind of cognitive enhancement (i.e., with the aim of exceeding or complementing normal healthy 
levels of cognitive functioning), it’s unclear how the condition could be satisfactorily met in cases 
where memory technology is relied on for therapeutic purposes—viz., in the service of correcting 
some cognitive defect or pathology. Consider again, our case of Otto: what mechanisms are 
available for Otto to endorse the reliability of his extended memory process in an epistemically 
respectable way? Here Carter and Kallestrup argue that Otto faces a dilemma: Otto’s endorsement 
of the reliability of his extended memory is not epistemically respectable if, in the course of the 
endorsement of its reliability, he relies on his failing biological memory. The natural alternative is to 
endorse the reliability of his memory tech in a way that relies on the memory tech which he uses to 
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compensate for his failing biological memory. But this kind of endorsement would be epistemically 
circular—viz., it would involve relying on a method to endorse the reliability of that very method 
(see, e.g., Cohen 2002). Thus, as Carter and Kallestrup argue, proponents of extended memory 
knowledge who embrace a reliability endorsement condition are left with a dilemma that is 
grounded in this circularity problem: either drop the kind of endorsement condition suggested by 
Pritchard and risk an over-inclusive view of extended knowledge, or embrace the condition and 
then explain how Otto could possibly satisfy it in an epistemically respectable (non-epistemically-
circular) way. 
 
Clark (2015) has in a recent paper has posed what constitutes a third kind of puzzle for the 
vindication of extended memory knowledge—a puzzle he calls the extended knowledge dilemma. 
Clark states the dilemma as follows: 
 
Extended Knowledge Dilemma: Otto must either consciously encounter the [sic. memory 
tech] as an object for epistemically hygienic practice, or not. If he does, this makes the [sic. 
memory tech] look, at that moment, more like external equipment (it may then be a source 
of knowledge while failing to be part of Otto). If he doesn’t, it looks unable (even on these 
weakened forms of virtue epistemology) to act as a source of knowledge (2015, p. 3763). 
 
Clark’s key insight underwriting the dilemma is that the very act of conscious engagement with the 
equipment—conscious engagement which suitable epistemic hygiene plausibly demands—stands in 
at least prima facie tension with the kind of uncritical engagement with tech that would need to be 
in place for the artefact to play a functionally analogous role as biomemory. Clark (2015) himself 
has attempted to resolve this dilemma by appealing to sub-personal forms of epistemic hygiene; cf., 
Pritchard (2017) for a different take. Whether this and the other puzzles concerning the memory-
technology grounded knowledge can be satisfactorily resolved remains a live and fruitful area of 
contemporary research at the intersection of epistemology and the philosophy of mind and 
cognitive science.  
 
The foregoing three epistemological dilemmas reveal how the phenomenon of extracranially stored 
information interfaces with the central epistemic standing of theoretical interest in mainstream 
epistemology—viz., propositional knowledge (i.e., knowledge-that). However, the emergence of 
memory technologies has generated discussion amongst epistemologists about other epistemic 
standings as well, including knowledge-how. 
 
Knowledge-how has been, since Gilbert Ryle (1949), taken to be something fundamentally distinct 
from propositional knowledge, at least, until Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001) 
influentially contested this distinction at around the turn of the 21st century. According to Stanley 
and Williamson (see also Stanley 2011), knowing how to do something is a kind of propositional 
knowledge. For example, knowing how to ride a bike is just a matter of knowing, of some way, w, 
that w is the way for you to ride a bike. If Stanley and Williamson’s position, intellectualism, is 
correct, then the notion of ‘extended knowledge-how’ is not going to be interestingly different from 
the kinds of extended knowledge-that considered previously in this section.  
 
The situation is, however, interestingly different if one embraces instead an anti-intellectualist 
model of know-how, according to which—following Ryle—knowing how is a matter of possessing 
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certain abilities rather than holding certain propositional attitudes (Fantl 2013). Of course, some 
abilities involve memory, and if memory processes can criss-cross the boundaries of brain, body and 
world, then plausibly so can memory abilities themselves which the anti-intellectualist identifies 
with memory supported knowledge-how. Consider, for example, the following case, taken from 
Carter and Czarnecki (2016), involving the ability to withdraw money from an ATM. In the normal 
(intracranial case), part of what it is to exercise the ability to withdraw money from an ATM is to be 
disposed to exercise the intracranial cognitive process of retrieving the information about one’s PIN 
number stored in biomemory (along with information about how to properly enter this number). 
Now, suppose Clark and Chalmers’ hero, Otto, uses an ATM machine in ways that are entirely 
ordinary except that he stores his PIN number and usage instructions in his notebook, which is (on 
the extended cognition model) part of his extended memory. To the extent that the anti-
intellectualist will attribute know-how to an individual, in the intracranial case, in virtue of 
biomemory storage of PIN number (and usage) information, Carter and Czarnecki argue, we should 
attribute know-how to Otto in the extended case, in virtue of his extended memory ability, viz., an 
ability he has partly in virtue of information he has written in his notebook. To the extent that this 
thinking is on the right track, extracranial memory technologies might support attributions of not 
just knowledge-that, but also knowledge-how, on the basis of information stored outside the head. 
 
Whilst extended cognition offers one way to think of human memory outside of received 
intracranial bounds, there is a further form of “active externalism” (Clark and Chalmers 1998; Carter 
et al 2014)—viz., distributed cognition—which maintains that memory can be distributed across 
multiple individuals in collaboration. The suggestion that memory and memory processes could be 
realised by multiple individuals, from two-person transactive memory systems (Wegner et al. 1985; 
Wegner 1986) to scientific research teams, raises important epistemological questions, and has 
been a topic of interest in recent work on collective knowledge (e.g., Palermos 2016; forthcoming, 
Michaelian & Sutton 2013; Michaelian & Arango-Muñoz forthcoming). 
 
Palermos (2016), for example, drawing from John Greco’s (2010) virtue reliabilist epistemology, 
argues that what he calls “social machines”, a paradigmatic instance being the Wikipedia 
contributor community, are the proper subjects of distributed memory knowledge, provided certain 
conditions for reliable cooperative interaction are satisfied. Michaelian & Arango-Muñoz 
(forthcoming) by contrast have called in to question whether collective memory processes involving 
non-human components should count as generating collective memory knowledge by virtue 
reliabilist lights, given that it’s not clear how the non-human components of the system could (as 
per virtue reliabilism) properly deserve credit for the knowledge in question. Michaelian & Arango-
Muñoz opt, instead, for a process reliabilist framework, a move that involves jettisoning the ‘ability’ 
condition on knowledge.  
 
We conclude this section by considering briefly some epistemological ramifications of memory 
technologies on metacognition—viz., cognitive processes and beliefs that have as their object our 
own (first-order) cognitive processes and knowledge states. As Evan Risko & Sam Gilbert (2016) 
have noted, reliance on memory technology can itself shape the way we think about our memory 
capacities as well as (in some cases) our capacities as knowers. In a study by Matthew Fisher, Mariel 
Goddu, and Frank Keil (2015), for example, it was shown that the process of online retrieval of 
information tends to lead individuals to believe that they have more knowledge ‘in the head’ than 
they actually do (Carter and Gordon 2016). Related studies reported by Risko & Gilbert (e.g., Ward 
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2013; Wenger & Ward 2013) showed that individuals reported increased ‘cognitive self-esteem’ 
after recently retrieving external information. One potential conclusion to draw from such studies, 
as noted by Risko & Gilbert, is that a metacognitive ramification of relying on external cognitive 
offloading is a kind ‘blurring’ of the difference between one’s own knowledge and knowledge 
stored elsewhere (Carter and Gordon 2016). 
 
That we have increasing memory storage options itself raises new metacognitive challenges. 
Santiago Arango-Muñoz (2013) outlines two such problems: the selection problem which concerns 
the choice one faces regarding whether to store information internally or externally, a choice that 
(if not arbitrary) must be decided metacognitively in some way or another for any given memory 
task. Likewise, Arango-Muñoz notes a further problem concerning how to decide at the level of 
endorsement between a given internal as opposed to external output. On his view, such decisions 
are fruitfully modeled as mediated by metamemory in such a way as to be guided by metacognitive 
feelings (e.g., feeling of knowing, the feeling of confidence, the feeling of error and the tip-of-the- 
tongue phenomenon). To the extent that such a view is feasible, then it should be clear how 
reliance on memory technologies raises important new issues in the epistemology of metacognition 
as well as in the related area of the epistemology of emotions (e.g., Brady 2013). 
4. Ethics 
Ethics is the branch of philosophy concerned with values and moral principles governing individual 
and collective behaviour, focussing on systematizing, analysing, and defending concepts of right and 
wrong conduct. It addresses norms on an individual, political, and societal level. Normative 
dimensions of memory technologies have received a great deal of attention in recent debates. A 
major normative concern about memory technologies is the desirability of their effects on biological 
memory. Such worries go back to Socrates who, in Plato’s Phaedrus, claims that 
 
“[Writing] will produce forgetfulness in the minds of those who learn to use it, because they 
will not practice their memory. Their trust in writing, produced by external characters which 
are no part of themselves, will discourage the use of their own memory” (Plato 1925, p. 
275a). 
 
Socrates thus argues that writing has detrimental effects on biological memory as it allows us to 
store information in the environment, which, in turn, means we do not sufficiently practice our 
memory skills. Similar concerns have recently been expressed about the Internet. Nicolas Carr 
(2011) argues that relying on the Internet as an external memory system reduces the amount of 
facts we store in semantic memory, in that way making us less knowledgeable. Carr’s book has hit a 
nerve and generated substantial debate in both popular and academic media.  
 
Furthermore, Carr claims that it is not just our memory that is effected by relying on online 
information but also our identity and even our culture. “When we outsource our memory to a 
machine, we also outsource a very important part of our intellect and even our identity” (2011, p. 
195), a point that has been given a different interpretation by Heersmink (2016b) who argues that 
external information can be constitutive of one’s autobiographical memory and thus also of one’s 
diachronic self. To the extent that this is right, outsourcing our memory needn’t be interpreted as 
‘outsourcing our identity’, as such, but rather as widening the constitutive base that forms it.  
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On Carr’s interpretation, however, one that focuses in the main on the relation between culture 
and memory, when the contents of biological memory become more shallow, human culture 
becomes more shallow as well. This is so because “personal memory shapes and sustains the 
collective memory that underpins culture […] The offloading of memory to external data banks does 
not just threaten the depth and distinctiveness of the self. It threatens the depth and 
distinctiveness of the culture we all share” (2011, p. 196). Susan Greenfield expresses similar views 
when she writes “Those with more facts at their immediate disposal can build richer constructs of 
reality and thus have a world view informed by a context that enables deeper understanding, more 
wisdom (2014, p. 221, original italics). On her view, Internet-use thus generates a culture in which 
people are less wise. Due to constant information access, Carr sees a new kind of human self 
emerging. Quoting writer Richard Foreman, he concludes that we risk turning into “pancake people 
- spread wide and thin as we connect with that vast network of information accessed by the mere 
touch of a button” (2011, p. 196). This quote is not meant to be descriptive but normative: we 
should not become pancake people. “To remain vital, culture must be renewed in the minds of the 
members of every generation. Outsource memory, and culture withers” (2011, p. 197). 
 
It seems that Carr and Greenfield prefer a thick and isolated mind, rather than a thin and wide 
mind. However, it is important to note that we have always have been pancake people. Several 
theorists argue that the human self is essentially a soft self. On Clark’s (2003) view, for example, we 
are “natural-born cyborgs”, that is, creatures who are essentially open to incorporate artifacts and 
technologies into their perceptual, behavioural, and cognitive systems as to enhance and 
complement their abilities. On his view, “our best tools and technologies literally become us: the 
human self emerges as a soft self, a constantly negotiable collection of resources easily able to 
straddle and criss-cross the boundaries between biology and artifact” (Clark 2007, p 278). Donald 
(1991) presents a similar view, but focusses more on the historical and evolutionary aspects of our 
soft selves. Debunking the myth of the isolated mind, Donald (2000) points out that throughout the 
recent evolution of our cognitive system, we have always relied on external information to aid and 
offload biological memory. Our goal should not be to prevent us from having a wide mind - we 
cannot, because we always had one - but to actively shape the kind of wide mind we want to have.  
 
Carr and Greenfield’s criticisms are largely based on research in cognitive psychology, showing that 
when we know trivial statements such as “an ostrich’s eye is bigger than its brain” are available 
externally, we tend to put less effort into memorizing that information internally (Sparrow, Liu & 
Wegner 2011). Likewise, people taking pictures of objects in an art museum have less detailed 
memories of the photographed objects as compared to museum objects they had not 
photographed (Henkel 2014). Benjamin Storm, Sean Stone and Aaron Benjamin (2016) show that 
using the Internet to retrieve information influences one’s propensity to use the Internet again to 
retrieve more information. Participants using Google Search to answer difficult trivia questions are 
more likely to use it again when faced with easier trivia questions as compared to people who 
answered the initial difficult questions from memory. So, perhaps unsurprisingly, one’s history of 
Internet use partly determines one’s future Internet use. Amanda Ferguson, David McLean and 
Evan Risko (2015) examined the impact of Internet-access on the metacognitive processes that 
underlie our decision whether to answer general knowledge questions such as “of which country is 
Baghdad the capital?” When people have access to the Internet, it decreased their willingness to 
volunteer answers. The authors theorize that due to the large amount of information available 
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online, participants “raise the bar” with respect to the evidence needed before volunteering 
answers based on their own internal knowledge stores. 
 
Carr and Greenfield have used the research performed by Sparrow et al (2011) to claim that the 
Internet makes us less knowledgeable, but the generalizability of this research to the Internet has 
been questioned, as Sparrow et al’s research does not actually involve using the Internet 
(Heersmink 2016c). Their research involves storing trivial statements in folders on a desktop 
computer in a psychology laboratory. Whether storing information on a desktop computer is 
relevantly similar to using the Internet in real-world situations as to justify the claims Sparrow et al 
make about the Internet needs more justification. One key difference between trivia stored on 
one’s desktop and online information (such as, e.g., Google Maps, a recipe, a train timetable, a 
weather forecast) is that using online information typically has real-world consequences (e.g., 
getting lost, wet, late, etc.). For this reason, it is more likely to be stored and remembered by the 
agent. Although it is very likely that the Internet transforms our biological memory systems 
(Ferguson, McLean & Risko 2015; Storm, Stone & Benjamin 2016), currently we do not yet have a 
full understanding of how using the Internet as an external memory system transforms our 
biological memory systems. We need more empirical evidence and conceptual analysis about the 
effects of Internet-use on biological memory, and we need to work out how these changes are 
culturally significant.  
 
In contrast to Carr and Greenfield’s negative views, others have argued that memory technologies 
can also have beneficial effects for memory, self, and human well-being (Konrad, Isaacs & Whittaker 
2016; Heersmink 2016b). There is a close link between autobiographical memory and the self. 
Marya Schechtman (2011), for example, argues that we summarize our past experiences into an 
autobiographical narrative, which is constitutive of our diachronic self; our self as it unfolds over 
time. Who we are as persons is thus defined and constituted by our autobiographical narrative. 
Patients with memory disorders like amnesia, Alzheimer’s disease or other forms of dementia lack 
the capacity to consolidate new autobiographical memories, which has quite undesirable 
consequences for their self. To compensate for their memory loss, some patients use a SenseCam, 
which is small wearable camera worn around one’s neck that automatically takes a photo when its 
internal sensors detect a change in environmental conditions such as light, angle and position. At 
the end of the day, irrelevant photos are deleted and the meaningful photos are edited into a lifelog 
which contains a record of a patient’s daily activities. Empirical research in human-computer 
interaction has shown that reviewing a visual lifelog has beneficial effects on a patient’s 
autobiographical memory such as maintaining the integrity, delay the disintegration, or in some 
cases replace autobiographical memory (Doherty et al 2012). Some go further and argue that 
lifelogs can be constitutive of autobiographical memory (Heersmink 2016b). If this metaphysical 
claim is true, then the narrative self seems to be partly constituted by external memory devices and 
can thus under certain conditions be seen as extended or distributed.  
 
Evocative objects (Turkle 2007) can also be interwoven with our narrative self. Petrelli, Whittaker 
and Brockmeier (2008) conducted field studies in which participants gave an interviewer a tour 
through their homes describing how and why particular objects are autobiographically meaningful. 
Consider what a participant says about her mug: 
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“I feel very emotionally attached to it for some reason. (…) I bought it in London, when I was 
working in London. I think it is the memory of working in publishing, living in London and 
going through a sort of fulfilling patch in my career. (…) Also, I associate it with buying my 
first house. (…) So, it is an object of continuity because I think I must have had it for… Ohh… 
let me think, I probably had it for nearly 20 years” (2008, p. 56). 
This quote shows that artifacts can provide connections to emotionally-laden past events and 
episodes for a long period, in that way providing long-term stable connections to past experiences. 
Reflecting on their empirical work, Petrelli and Whittaker write “Recollecting our lives makes use of 
both physical and narrative aspects: mementos mark events, while the narrative plot organises 
these scattered points” (2010, p. 154). On their view, evocative objects and narratives complement 
each other. Our embodied interactions with evocative objects trigger and sometimes constitute 
emotionally-laden autobiographical memories. These memories are the building blocks of our 
narrative, which, in turn, helps us to make sense of our evocative objects. Empirical and 
ethnographic research can thus inform philosophical reflection on memory and the narrative self.  
 
Human biological memory is prone to transience, bias, suggestibility, misattribution and various 
other “sins” (Schacter 2001). Like Donald (1991), Viktor Mayer-Schonberger (2009) points out that 
digital memory technologies such as the Internet have very different properties as compared to 
biological memory. Online information storage is cheap and highly reliable, dissemination is easy, 
and access is global. In some cases, the Internet stores personal information (e.g., photos on social 
media, status updates, tweets, blogposts) we may want to forget. There are situations in which 
digital memory is too good, in that we cannot delete it and have no control over who can access it. 
Mayer-Schonberger points out that forgetting has an important social function and that digital 
memory can be quite unforgiving in that it does not forget. Once Google has archived (personal) 
information, it is very difficult to remove it from the Internet. He therefore suggests to include an 
expiration date into the metadata of personal information such that it is automatically deleted after 
that date, giving users control over their personal information. A number of theorists argue that we 
have a right to be forgotten (Ghezzi, Pereira & Vesnic-Alujevic 2014). There are obvious connections 
here to the notion of informational privacy as discussed in the field of information ethics. 
Informational privacy is an important moral value and is defined as the “interest of individuals in 
exercising control over access to information about themselves” (van den Hoven, Blauw, Pieters & 
Warnier 2014). If our external memories are publicly accessible, then we should be more careful in 
generating certain online content. Others, however, have argued that this may lead to self-
censorship, which limits human freedom (Mayer-Schonberger 2009). 
 
Memory technologies may have potentially undesirable effects on autonomy and agency (Reiner & 
Nagel forthcoming). For instance, empirical research in cognitive psychology shows that repeatedly 
using navigation systems results in a decrease in the level of detail in our internal cognitive maps 
(Burnett & Lee 2005), thereby potentially diminishing our capacity to navigate without such devices. 
Do such memory devices make us more autonomous by allowing us to perform more cognitive 
tasks, or do they make us less autonomous by becoming too reliant on them? If they do make us 
less autonomous, is that necessarily a bad thing? One could argue that human agency has always 
depended on technologies. We are inherently tool-using creatures (Clark 2003) that need 
technology for their basic survival.  
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Questions of responsibility arise when we use our external memory devices for important tasks 
such as navigating. When Apple introduced its new navigation app in 2012, there were initially 
some bugs in the system which led people to navigate onto a taxiway of an Alaskan airport and 
straight into the Australian desert, potentially resulting in dangerous situations. Who is responsible 
when our external memory system provides us with wrong information? The designer, user, or can 
we somehow blame the technology? Apple took responsibility by removing the vice president of 
iOS software from his position. Given the organizational structure of large companies, this makes 
sense. However, it also seems reasonable to attribute some responsibility to the users of the 
technology. We can expect users to be at least somewhat critical when their navigation system 
instructs them to drive onto the taxiway of an airport or into the desert. In his most recent book, 
Carr (2014) refers to blindly trusting one’s navigation system as automation bias. When navigators 
uncritically take for granted the truth-value of navigation systems “their trust in the software 
becomes so strong that they ignore or discount other sources of information, including their own 
senses” (Carr 2014, p. 69). Given our human tendency for automation bias, one may ask to what 
extend we are responsible for relying on our external memory. In ethics of technology, some 
philosophers have argued that we should design technology such that it is consistent with our moral 
values, which is referred to as value-sensitive design (van den Hoven & Manders-Huits 2009). Safety 
is an important moral value and so we ought to design navigation systems (as well as other external 
memory systems that are prone to generate automation bias) such that they are safer to use. 
  
Finally, a number of philosophers have argued that memory technologies have a certain moral 
status. Clark and Chalmers point out that an implication of the extended mind thesis is that “in 
some cases interfering with someone’s environment will have the same moral significance as 
interfering with their person” (1998, p. 18). Further building on this insight, Johnny Søraker argues 
that “the case with Otto’s notebook suggests that information and information technology can have 
moral status, but only if they are constitutive and irreplaceable in a strong sense” (2007, p. 14). So 
because external memory can have the same ontological status as internal memory, it also has 
moral status. Their ontological status (as outlined in §2) thus has straightforward moral 
implications. Carter and Palermos (2016) argue that, for these reasons, stealing or otherwise 
intervening in one’s extended mind should be seen as a personal assault. This has both ethical and 
legal consequences. Besides the traditional legal issues with theft and artifact ownership, this view 
provides an additional argument against intervening with someone’s external memory. This implies 
there are fruitful but underexplored links between neuroethics, neurolaw, and extended cognition 
theory (Levy 2007; Reiner & Nagel forthcoming). 
5. Conclusion  
Memory technologies continue to generate substantial debate in philosophy and cognitive science, 
but also in the humanities and social sciences more broadly. They are an exciting focal point for 
interdisciplinary research. To better understand their historical development, informational, 
functional and epistemic properties, cognitive and cultural consequences, and normative aspects, 
we need to take an interdisciplinary approach where philosophers can analyse and synthesize 
concepts and approaches from cognitive science, neuroscience, cultural studies, cognitive 
archaeology, and human-computer interaction. Informed by empirical research and thus taking a 
naturalistic approach, this article has given an integrative overview of the philosophical dimensions 
of memory technologies. It has drawn connections between their metaphysical, epistemological 
and ethical aspects, as well as identified some topics for future research. 
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